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chieving a world free of landmines will require at least US$1 billion in additional funding.
Bridging this gap will require using all available funding sources and maximizing the efficiency
of spending. Innovative finance can help achieve both aims by accessing funding not traditionally available for mine action. To explore these options further, the UK government commissioned
work to examine the potential roles of innovative finance in mine action. After discussions with a
range of stakeholders, a broad consensus emerged around three approaches. First, outcomes finance,
whereby funding disburses against independently verified results, such as mine clearance and recovery of activity on cleared land; the focus on results incentivizes effective implementation. Second,
outcomes-based public private partnerships, whereby a government transfers land to the private sector conditional on mine clearance, with in some cases the government (or a donor) also subsidizing restoration of productive activity on the land, conditional on achievement of goals such as employment
creation. Third, front-loaded funding, whereby donors make long-term pledges of annual funding to
mine action; highly rated bonds are then issued to finance more immediate mine action by securitizing
the long-term pledges.
It is estimated that there is a US$1 billion shortfall in funding
to deliver the 2025 aspiration of a world free of landmines. There
is also an imbalance in funding, which limits progress that some
mine-affected countries can make towards becoming mine free.
The funding gap is likely to increase due to budgetary pressures on
traditional donors caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Though it is
challenging, this means that it is even more important that alternative funding mechanisms be developed. Donors and national mine
authorities will need to be creative and innovative, and everyone
will need to contribute.
Over the past few years there has been plenty of discussion in the
broader development community around “alternative development
financing.” However this has not been the case in the mine action
community. It is worth recalling the Political Declaration agreed

to by States Parties in Oslo at the end of 2019: “We will explore
options for new and alternative sources of funding with a view
to increasing the resources available to realize the Convention’s
aims.”1 This commitment is also contained in Action 42 of the Oslo
Action Plan.2
With this in mind, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth &
Development Office brought together a team including Social
Finance3 and The HALO Trust4 to look at how innovative finance
could accelerate mine clearance while improving its efficiency. The
team talked to a range of governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and private sector stakeholders, and found a broad
consensus as to the current challenges affecting funding, and how
new financing mechanisms could improve funding and incentivize
more effective mine action implementation.

Challenges
Six challenges to more effective mine action came up repeatedly
in the team’s discussions:
• Inadequate funding for mine action, partly because mine
clearance is not always seen as a development need
• Funding structures that do not incentivize efficient implementation of mine action
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•
•
•
•

Short-term, uncertain funding leading to difficulties in effective planning
Insufficient data on the benefits of mine action
Sometimes weak national ownership for mine action and
inadequate linkages to broader development planning
Sub-optimal coordination within and between donor
governments.

Making Mine Action More Efficient and Effective
The stakeholder discussions led to the development of innovative financing mechanisms that held strong promise of overcoming these challenges. Once preliminary versions of the
mechanisms were ready, they were further developed against

the specific challenges faced in representative case study countries—Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia—with the invaluable contribution of national mine authorities and other country
stakeholders.

Mechanism 1: Outcomes Finance
Traditional grant finance disburses against inputs with payments often not, or only marginally, linked to results. By contrast,
outcomes finance disburses against independently verified results,
such as mine clearance and recovery of social and economic activity on land cleared of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Outcomes finance could also potentially disburse against victim
assistance and risk education, although measuring success may be
more difficult.
What is outcomes finance? By definition, outcomes finance
focuses on results rather than means, making it a powerful tool
to incentivize flexible, adaptive implementation geared to achieving results rather than following rigid log-frames. It could bring
together disparate actors to finance effective and efficient mine
action, and hold service providers to account with rigorous and
independently verified data on results. The broadest form of outcomes finance is an outcomes fund, which makes pooled funding
available for any qualifying program that aims to achieve defined
objectives, such as restoration of activity on cleared land. Funds
can be made available competitively, so that only the most promising and cost-effective proposals are offered funding against prospective achievement of defined goals.
Outcomes funding pays ex-post, so there is a need for a source
of working/risk capital to cover the gap between program funding
and payment for the results the program has achieved. This capital
can come from service providers themselves, or from an impact
bond, which sources external risk capital from a development
financial institution (DFI) and social investors, and potentially has
additional advantages discussed in Section 2 on paycheck protection programs (PPPs). Investors are attracted to impact bonds by
the mix of financial and social returns (paid by the donors/outcomes payers upon successful achievement of outcomes), and the
potential to introduce a more dynamic, adaptive, and effective way
of managing development programs.
Especially where the capital comes from service providers themselves, there is a need for early payments on outputs. For mine
clearance organizations it might make sense for donors to pay
them the full costs of the clearance on completion of the outputs,
with a bonus (paid by the donor/outcomes payer) when final outcomes are achieved (to encourage collaboration with other actors).
Outcomes finance of any form can coalesce different departments within a single donor behind the common goal of achieving
agreed results and can help bring similar cohesion to recipient governments and service providers. It can also play a role in facilitating

collaboration between donors behind shared objectives. Greater
national ownership is also encouraged by having the progress of
national programs measured objectively and publicly.
Making payment conditional on objectively measured mine
action results—including broader development benefits—could
also help secure new and enlarged donor funding by (a) reassuring
donors skeptical of the cost-effectiveness of mine action compared
to other development programs (since they only pay on achievement of outcomes), and (b) reassuring donors that the benefits of
mine action will be measured with rigorous and independently
verified metrics.
Outcomes finance in practice: an example. Results payments
in an outcomes finance structure would likely be made against
independently evaluated outcomes, for example, restoration of
economic and social activity. As illustrated in Figure 1, donors create a pooled outcomes fund that supports both mine clearance and
restoration of economic activity on cleared land (in this example,
sustainable agriculture).
The fact that there are payments against an end-stage results,
in this case restoration of agriculture, motivates mine action and
rural development service providers to find ways to work together.
This is because some or all payments to both are dependent on
achieving a common goal (to make the model workable, mine
clearance operatives would receive almost all their funding against
achievement of cleared land, with an incentive bonus for ultimate
achievement of economic and social objectives). Demining obviously has to precede restoration of farming or livestock, but the
work of preparing for that restoration—for example, design of
training and provision of agricultural tools and seeds—needs to
begin before demining is completed. This is particularly important
where beneficiaries include ex-combatants who may have no previous agricultural experience.
Where the political economy allows, an outcomes fund could
also work to align interests, facilitate cooperation, and pool funding between neighboring countries to clear border land. This alignment of interests would facilitate mine action planning across a
region, in turn helping to increase the effectiveness and efficiencies
of the program, and potentially enhancing stabilization.
Benefits of the model. Outcomes finance brings a more flexible and adaptive approach to implementation. With accountability linked to results rather than inputs, service providers have
the freedom and the incentive to continuously adapt and improve
their implementation, without the need to seek funders’ approval

ISSUE 25.2 @ FALL-WINTER 2021

5

Donors

Financing the Outcomes Fund

Overview of key steps:

Financial ﬂows
In-kind support

1

Donors commit funds and
agree on desired outcomes

2

Outcomes Fund runs
procurement process to select
promising programmes(1)

3

Investors provide upfront
investment for service
provider to run the service

4

Results are independently
veriﬁed and claimed for payment

5

Outcomes Fund disburses
outcomes payments based on
independent veriﬁcation

6

Service providers use outcomes
payment to continue operation
and/or repay investors

1

Investors

Outcomes Fund

Only needed if service providers
require working/risk capital to
finance delivery of outcomes

Disbursing against verified
outcomes

2

3

5

Services Providers
Mine/ERW Clearance Contractors
and/or agriculture support

Upfront
investment if
needed by service
providers

4
6

Repayment
based on
outcomes
achieved

(1) Programs can be run by a service provider independently or with the ﬁnancial support of an investor, in which case it becomes an impact bond

Figure 1. (Example) Outcomes fund for restoration of sustainable agriculture on contaminated land.
(within fiduciary and safeguard norms). This flexibility is crucial
in mine action where the return of land, whether rural or urban,
to effective economic and social activity may depend on close collaboration across a broad spectrum of actors, including direct beneficiaries, financial institutions, value chains, extension agents/
business development support (BDS) providers, etc.
Outcomes finance also encourages longer planning horizons,
bringing more predictability and efficiency to both governments
and service providers by guaranteeing finance against completion
of a defined task. Indeed, one option in countries close to being
mine free is for donors to make payments (or a significant bonus
payment) against mine clearance completion nationwide or in a
defined region.
Further, outcomes finance also has the potential to strengthen
national ownership of mine action; as it can, through the choice
of outcomes, be aligned directly with national priorities. Where
a broad range of development outcomes are selected, it could
also help to catalyze increased collaboration between ministries.

Accurate reporting of mine clearance is encouraged by the linkage
to subsequent successful use of the land.
Challenges to overcome. Introducing any new finance model
incurs challenges that will need to be carefully planned for. These
challenges include
• Lack of expertise with innovative financing instruments,
including in planning for and managing outcomes-based
payments; nonetheless impact bonds have been successfully
introduced across a range of sectors in nineteen low- and
middle-income countries over the past seven years.5
• Patchy current measurement of mine action outcomes;
accurate and on-time reporting of outcomes is one of the
central capacity-building elements of any results-based
financing instrument.
• Risk that financing becomes the primary focus rather than
activities and outcomes, particularly if there are multiple
stakeholders; this underlines the need for the payment
incentive structure to be carefully aligned with broad mine
action goals.

Mechanism 2: Outcomes-Based, Public-Private Partnerships
Any significant return of safe, private sector activity to currently
mined land will require subsidies, both for mine clearance itself
and also in many cases to support the initial investment in productive economic activity on the cleared land. However, traditional
input-based subsidies, especially those to private enterprises, are
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notorious for misallocating resources and creating perverse incentives. Outcome-based subsidies, on the other hand, directly reward
achievement of a defined result, rather than subsidizing inputs that
may or may not help achieve that result. An outcomes-based PPP
model is designed to support and incentivize both mine clearance

agriculture extension, business development services, and skills training for
Making payments to
Providing land to investors
Implact Bond Investors
potential employees. The risk with tra1
1
ditional approaches to providing these
Land transfer
Payments on achievement
services is that they have a relatively
upon successful
of outcomes
clearance
(e.g. income or employment)
poor record worldwide of alignment
Financial Flows
Investors
3
with the real needs of the intended ben3
Financing projects
Land Transfer
eficiaries (farmers, small- and mediumproducing income
Impact Bond Investors
and employment
sized enterprises [SMEs], potential
Service Provision
2
employees, etc.), and therefore often
2
fail to achieve significant economic or
Mine/ERW
SMEs or
Service Providers
social impact. Outcomes finance, on the
e.g. agriculture extension,
Clearance
Commercial
other hand, has been shown to support
skills training
Contractors
Agriculture
Clears land for
investment
service provision in a way that aligns
it more closely with the needs of benOverview of key steps:
eficiaries. This alignment is achieved by
Impact Bond
PPP
rewarding service providers only when
Government enters into
Outcomes funders enter into agreement
1
agreed end-results in terms of income
1
agreement with investors
with Impact Bond investors (outcomes contract)
and employment are achieved, rather
Investors pay for mine action
than for providing a service whether or
activities and invest on clear land
2
Investors provide funding for activities
2
for productive activities
not it actually meets the supposed bento service providers
eficiaries’ needs.
Government transfers land
Outcomes Fund disburses outcomes
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3
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ers experience difficulty in borrowing
significant amounts of working/risk
Figure 2. Example of an impact bond PPP model.
capital to bridge the funding gap until
and subsequent private sector, for-profit, investment. The founda- (hopefully) payments for outcomes are received. In these circumtion of the approach is transfer of land to the private sector, con- stances an Impact Bond (shown on the right of Figure 2) is one
ditional on successful mine clearance, creating the conditions for promising solution.
investment and subsequent socioeconomic development (thanks to
Benefits of the model. An outcomes-based public-private partChris Mathias of the British Asian Trust for this suggestion).
nership model shares many of the same benefits as the outcomes
Outcomes-based, public-private partnerships in practice: finance model noted previously, including potential for greater
an example. Specifically, the proposal is that the government com- flexibility and adaptability, enhanced national ownership, and
mits to transferring ownership of part or all of a plot of contami- improved predictability and efficiency. Furthermore, an outcomesnated land to a private investor upon successful mine clearance based public-private partnership has the potential to break down
financed by that investor. Where land is highly valuable and con- siloes between national government entities, donor agencies, and
tamination relatively easy to clear, the investor might be expected organizations working within and outside of the mine action sector
to receive only a portion of the land from the government in return (education or agriculture) by aligning interests and incentives.
for clearance, paying market price for the remainder. Conversely,
Impact bonds rely on external private investors to provide the risk/
where land is less valuable and more expensive to clear, the gov- working capital that service providers often cannot reasonably afford.
ernment may need to forgo any payment from the investor for the Relying on experienced external capital has the further advantage
land, and pay a portion of the cost of mine clearance as well. This of allowing an increased degree of flexibility, adaptation, and pruapproach is shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2.
dent risk-taking from service providers, compared to self-financing.
The transfer of ownership of cleared land may be incentive Impact bond capital typically comes from development fund instituenough on its own to foster not only mine clearance but also invest- tions (DFIs) and private sector social financiers who hire experienced
ment on the demined land. However, in many cases these incen- performance managers who use real-time data to facilitate quick and
tives may not be sufficient to generate investment that contributes continuous learning and adaptation to reach the agreed payment metmeaningfully to government goals of additional employment and rics. By contrast, where the working capital derives from the service
income, especially for vulnerable groups.
providers themselves, they are often unwilling and/or unable to take
In such cases where additional temporary subsidies are needed the calculated risks of a more flexible and adaptive approach, and are
to ensure optimal productive use of the cleared land, additional often unable to make the necessary use of real-time data compared to
subsidized support could be provided through services such as performance managers hired by external investors.
Government

Outcome Funder
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An impact bond for skills training in Palestine provides an example of how this approach can better align service provision with the
actual needs of the private sector. In this impact bond, the World
Bank is disbursing against (inter alia) trainees securing long-term
employment. This has incentivized skills training providers to work
closely and proactively with potential employers from the design of
the training to the initial apprenticeship. Similarly, conditioning
payment for business development service (BDS) and agriculture
extension on productivity improvements would incentivize service
provision that is much more closely and actively tailored to the real
needs of the beneficiaries.
As illustrated in Figure 2, an investor puts in risk/working capital to finance capacity building for the SMEs and their potential
employees (for example, BDS and skills training). An outcomes
funder provides conditional finance against verified outcomes such
as increased employment.

Where feasible, alignment between service providers and investors
would be further increased by having a single investor (or investor
group) investing in both the impact bond and the mine clearance and
SMEs/commercial agriculture.
Challenges to overcome. To ensure that goals and target
groups are in line with government priorities, this model would
need to be implemented in close coordination with both development and mine clearance entities within the government.
In addition to the challenges identified previously
• The applications of the PPP model must be carefully designed
so that they unlock private funding without compromising
national goals and requirements.
• Modalities of the collaboration with private companies will
likewise need to be handled sensitively so as to be in line with
national aspirations and standards.
• There is a risk of corruption in the land transactions, and
transparency will therefore need to be a key element in the
model’s application.

Mechanism 3: Front-loading funding
What is front-loading funding? A funding mechanism to

front-load finance based on multi-year donor pledges could be
used to improve continuity and planning for mine action programs, and also enable longer-term outcomes to be measured. The
International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) approach
could be applied to mine clearance, as it also employs quantifiable,
finite results. This model would have a particular benefit in supporting the accelerated completion of mine clearance in a country,
region, or other defined geography.
Front-loading funding in practice: an example. IFFIm (the
model for this analysis) is designed to accelerate disbursement of
funds to achieve more rapid dividends, while spreading the cost to
donors over a much longer period. In the case of mine action there
would be four elements:
1. Donor governments make long-term, irrevocable, and
legally-binding pledges of annual funding to mine action.
2. By using, for example, the World Bank as treasury manager,
these long-term pledges support the issuance of highly-rated
bonds, allowing the securitization of future pledges, and
thus more rapid results on the ground.
3. Funds are disbursed for priority mine clearance programs.
4. The selection of mine clearance programs for funding, and
the management of disbursing funds, is governed by an alliance (in the case of IFFIm it is Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance),
with a board that brings together key actors including recipient countries, donors, implementing organizations, and UN
agencies.
Benefits of front-loading funding. This model brings a number of benefits for donors and recipient countries as it provides
accelerated funding to maximize impact and reduce the costs of
interventions. The stable, multi-year funding, aligned to national
completion plans, facilitates the planning of activities and
enhances national ownership by giving beneficiary states a seat at
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the table. It also delivers on grand bargain objectives.6 It allows
for more rapid achievement of humanitarian and economic benefits,
thus potentially appealing to donors who do not want to be involved
in the long-haul of funding individual mine action programs.
While the same result could be achieved if donors were able to supply all of the required funding upfront, IFFIm has proven that donors
are willing to make long-term pledges where immediate funding is
not available. The legal and administrative mechanisms for making
such legally-binding pledges is already in place for ten donors from
their funding for IFFIm.
While there is a small cost to front loading from bond issuance
costs and interest on the bond (although this will be low because of
the strong sovereign credit rating of likely donors), there are four key
benefits:
• significant saving of lives and in preventing of disabilities
• efficiency gains from the economies of scale that can be
achieved from faster mine clearance
• administrative cost savings in being able to wind down
national mine action agencies earlier
• sovereign bond interest rates, even without any of the benefits noted previously and purely in net present value (NPV)
terms, benefit to accelerating the gains from mine action, as
the NPV discount rate far exceeds current sovereign bond
interest rates
The proposed approach could also attract new funders, who
would see immediate benefits without a significant immediate
call on aid resources. For some funders there is also the potential attraction that it does not require the added complexity of
involvement of the private sector, either as investors in an impact
bond or as partners in a PPP.
Challenges to be overcome. IFFIm has major administrative
overheads, but it becomes a cost-effective model at a value of about
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Camille Wallen
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The HALO Trust
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issuance
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disbursement and repayment)
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Figure 3. Front-loaded finance model.
$100 million or more in pledges. A mine clearance fund could
bring this threshold down considerably by initially focusing on a
small group of countries and a restricted set of donors. In addition,
the Mine Action Fund would only finance mine clearance, whereas
IFFIm finances fifteen distinct programs. By focusing on one, easilymeasurable objective, the management costs would be greatly
reduced. In addition, there is potential for further streamlining by
having the fund disburse on an outcomes basis; in that case the
Fund would simply pay out against progress towards mine-free status with a bonus on completion. Risk capital could be supplied by
an impact bond.

Next Steps
To make these mechanisms a reality that could materially
advance mine action globally, they will need to be piloted, potentially in one or more of the countries used as case studies in developing the mechanisms: Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. The
team’s full report6 identifies in detail the steps needed to move
towards piloting, but the key is to rapidly bring together major
stakeholders in pilot countries to start turning these models into
transformative reality.
Interested parties are encouraged to contact Joe Shapiro, Mine
Action Lead, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office,
joe.shapiro@fcdo.gov.uk.
See endnotes page ##
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